Abstract-Two anomaly detectors for control systems are analyzed with respect to their sensitivity to malicious data injection attacks. A stateless anomaly detector based on the current residual signal is compared to a cumulative sum detector. The worst-case impact of a stealthy time-limited data injection attack is characterized for both detectors by a nonconvex optimization problem and compared to determine which detector limits the impact the most. We prove that the problem can be solved by means of a set of convex optimization problems. Simulations verify that finding the right configuration for the cumulative sum is crucial to limit the worst-case attack impact more than with a stateless anomaly detector.
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N
In recent years, a great interest in cyber-physical security based on control theory has developed. This field complements security measures based on information technology such as data encryption. Control-theoretic anomaly detection uses the physical laws behind the system to determine if the data received matches the expected system behavior.
Texeira et al. [1] describe networked control systems under various attacks, introduce an attack space based on the adversary's resources and model knowledge, and then use it as a taxonomy for different attacks, like Denial-of-Service or zero-dynamic attacks. Pasqualetti et al. [2] describe the systems as linear time-invariant descriptor systems and several attacks are captured in their model. The authors also introduce a definition for the detectability and identifiability of attacks.
Several possible attack strategies and defense mechanisms have been discovered in the past years. Mo et al. [3] , for example, investigate replay attacks, where the attacker replays recorded data while attacking, and proposes a detection strategy by using additive noise. Smith [4] on the other hand discusses covert attacks, and uncovers several beneficial factors for this attack strategy.
In control theory, anomaly detectors based on the residual, which is determined by comparing actual measurements with predicted measurement signals, are generally used to detect randomly occurring faults but not coordinated malicious attacks. Therefore the ability of anomaly detectors to detect attacks and to diminish the attack impact has to be investigated.
Most research on cyber-physical security use a stateless anomaly detector based on the current residual to detect attacks, e.g. [1] , [5] , and only a few, such as [3] , use more advanced detectors. We want to investigate a detector based on a cumulative sum (CUSUM), which sums up the residuals with a forgetting factor over time and considers therefore the history of the residual signal.
Reference [6] is one of the first articles to our knowledge that uses a cumulative sum detector to detect attacks in a control-theoretic security context. One detector is designed for each measurement signal and it is shown that the investigated attacks are not able to take the system to an unsafe state without being detected. Furthermore, risk assessment is conducted to uncover weaknesses in the studied system and response strategies for handling an attack are also investigated. In Do et al. [7] , a special form of the CUSUM, the variable threshold window limited CUSUM, is used to detect a covert attack on a stochastic-dynamical system. The optimal configuration for the detector in [7] leads to a finite moving average filter.
Urbina et al. [8] present a comprehensive survey and taxonomy on the current literature about security of cyberphysical systems. Furthermore a novel metric based on the attack impact and the mean time between false-alarms is presented to compare anomaly detectors. The metric is tested for the CUSUM and stateless detector under attack in experiments and simulations, which show that a CUSUM detector performs better than the commonly used detector.
Our goal is to provide the mathematical foundations to expand the analysis from [8] . In particular, [8] considered only greedy attackers that try to maximize the impact at the next time step, and they only consider attacks to sensors or actuators, but not both. In this work we extend these previous results by formulating an optimization problem where adversaries can optimize their trajectory over a desired window of time. Another contribution is that our formulation allows us to model an attacker with general combinations of compromised sensors and actuators. The nonlinearity of the CUSUM makes the analysis of the CUSUM detector challenging, but we prove that the problem can be solved by means of convex optimization problems. Simulations show that the cumulative sum in the right configuration restricts the attack impact more than the stateless detector.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II presents background information. Section III introduces the problem of characterizing the worst-case impact of a time limited data injection attack. Furthermore, a reformulation of the CUSUM and a way to solve the problem is proposed in this section. Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV and the paper is concluded in Section V.
I I . B A C K G R O U N D
A. Networked Control Systems under Attack 1) Networked Control Systems: A networked control system is a control system, which uses a network to exchange data such as control inputs or sensor measurements. The physical plant can be modeled as a discrete-time state-space model
where x k ∈ R n is the state of the system, x 0 ∈ R n the initial state of the system,ũ k ∈ R l the control input received over the network, and y k ∈ R p the measurements at time instance k. The unknown process and measurement noise are w k ∈ R n and v k ∈ R p , respectively. Here, A ∈ R n×n is the system matrix, B ∈ R n×l is the control input matrix and C ∈ R p×n the measurement matrix. The system is controlled with a state feedback controller based on a state observer
Here, z k ∈ R n is the state of the observer, u k ∈ R l the calculated control input,ỹ k ∈ R p the measurements received over the network and r k ∈ R p is the residual. We assume the control matrix K ∈ R l×n and observer matrix L ∈ R n×p are chosen so that the closed-loop system and error dynamics are stable. The values ofũ k andỹ k can differ from the values of u k and y k due to data loss, noise in the network, or due to a malicious attack a k ∈ R m on the system. 2) Attack Model: We consider an attacker that has two ways to influence the system. The attacker can launch attacks on the system's state a x k and attacks on the system output a y k .
Introducing the attack vector
T to the plant and observer leads to
where B a represents the influence the attack has on the state by either a physical or an actuator attack and D a the influence of the attack on the measurements by falsifying sensor data. Due to the separation of the attacks into attacks on the states and the measurements, the attack matrices often take the structure
where 0 are zero matrices and have dimensions appropriate to the attack vector.
The adversary has limited resources and can attack only for a limited number of time steps N. After the attack the adversary is not able to influence the system again, i.e. a k = 0, ∀k ≥ N, assuming without loss of generality that the attack starts at k = 0. The attacker has perfect model knowledge about the plant and observer equations, knows about an upper bound for the noise processes, but does not know the initial conditions x 0 and z 0 . The adversary knows which anomaly detector is used and has knowledge about the configuration of the detector used, which is explained in further detail in Section II-B.3. Furthermore he tries to remain stealthy. Hence, the attack should not trigger any alarm in the anomaly detector (see Section II-B). In contrast to [8] , the attack here is an open loop attack, because the attacker uses only his model knowledge and disruptive resources, but cannot use y k and u k . This places the attacker in a plane of the attack space in [1] , which is spanned by the model knowledge and disruption resources. In Section IV-B we will indicate how a more powerful attacker can be taken into account.
3) Extended System Model: We combine the plant and the observer to get an extended system with
T as the extended system state, the attack a k as the input and the residual r k as the system output
with
The initial state is given by
Since K and L stabilize the plant and the error dynamics, A e is stable as well. The residual r k is used to determine how much the real system state deviates from the estimated state given by the observer. Therefore it can be used to detect faults or attacks on the system. Due to the linearity of the extended system we can separate the system into two parts, one, µ 0 k , which depends on the initial condition and the noise, and one part, µ a k , which depends on the attack
B. Anomaly Detectors
The attacks mentioned in the previous section are an unwelcome change of the extended system state and to detect their presence one can use anomaly detectors, which are usually designed to detect randomly occurring faults.
The basic principle of operation of the anomaly detectors is that at time instance l a metric S l is calculated based on system data, e.g. control inputs u l and measurementsỹ l in control systems, and an alarm is triggered if S l is greater than a threshold J D . In our case S l will be calculated using the residuals and the calculation of S l depends on the anomaly detector used. An anomaly detector is called stateless if it just considers the current residual signal r k to determine S k . A stateful detector on the other hand keeps track of the residual over time to determine the current metric S k . In the following the two detectors we want to compare are described.
1) Stateless Anomaly Detector: Stateless detectors are solely based on the current residual r k and the one used in our work is
The squared Euclidean norm is used because it leads to a simpler mathematical and numerical treatment later on.
2) Cumulative Sum: The CUSUM algorithm [9] is used to detect small changes in a variable θ of the signal investigated, e.g. θ could be the mean of the signal and it changes from its initial value θ 0 to θ 1 due to an attack. CUSUM is defined as
where g k has to have a positive trend (g k > 0) if a change in θ occurs and a negative trend (g k ≤ 0) if no change in θ occurs. Similar to [8] , we use a non-parametric CUSUM algorithm
The forgetting factor δ is used to avoid too many false alarms by eliminating the naturally occurring noise in the residual, while J D is used to detect if there is significant change in the residual signal over time. The forgetting factor should be chosen so that E{||r k || 2 2 − δ } ≤ 0 to achieve a negative trend for S k under no attack.
Remark 1: CUSUM is the optimal change detection algorithm if we know the probability distributions of the signal before and after the change in θ and want to detect the change in a minimal time while guaranteeing a certain false-alarm rate (see [10] , [11] ). In this case, the CUSUM can be interpreted as a repeated sequential likelihood ratio test, which restarts every time the security metric hits 0 or the threshold J D . However, in general we do not know the change an attack will cause in the residual and the probability distribution of the investigated signal before and after the change. Therefore we have to use the non-parametric CUSUM detector mentioned above.
3) Separating the Anomaly Detectors: In our attack model the adversary has no knowledge about the initial state of the extended system and only knows an upper bound for the noise processes, therefore we want to present here how he can exploit his knowledge about the detectors to design a stealthy attack without considering the interference of the noise and the initial state. Since we can separate the extended system into µ 0 k and µ a k , we are able to separate each anomaly detector as well into two virtual detectors S 0 k+1 and S a k+1 . To separate each detector we use the fact that r k = r 0 k + r a k and
We assume that the attacker knows the threshold J D of the detector used but also an upper bound for the noise influenced part of the detector
, which is defined so that no false alarm due to noise will happen during the attack. We define the threshold as J D = 2J 0 D + 2J a D and the attacker can deduce J a D , which is the margin the adversary has to attack the system without being detected. Additionally for the CUSUM detector we have to define δ = 2δ 0 + 2δ a , where the attacker knows δ . The virtual detectors guarantee that
This bound is tight, if r 0 k = r a k . In the remainder of the paper, we only consider µ a k and S a k+1 ≤ J a D to investigate which detector limits an attacker with this strategy the most.
A. Problem Formulation
The worst-case attack impact is characterized by an optimization problem, where the stealthiness of the attack is represented as constraints.
Problem 1: The worst-case attack impact an adversary can cause on the whole trajectory while remaining stealthy during the attack is characterized by
T ∈ R Nn represents the state trajectory and a = [a T 0 , . . . , a T N−1 ] T ∈ R Nm the attack trajectory over the attack horizon. The normalization matrix T Norm = blkdiag(T x Norm , · · · , T x Norm ) ∈ R Nn×Nn with T x Norm ∈ R n×n is used to have an easier way to compare states with different units and is defined so that if ||T Norm x|| ∞ ≤ 1 the system is in a safe state, similar to the safe sets introduced in [1] . This means that none of the elements of the states exceeds its maximum allowed value. Problem 1 can therefore be seen as a search for an attack which tries to bring the system (as close as possible) to an unsafe state that could damage the system or at least deteriorate the system's performance as much as possible while not triggering any alarms.
1) Boundedness of the Optimization Problem: Let us now investigate the boundedness of this problem. We start by rewriting µ a k and r a k so they only depend on the attacks a k . Recall that µ a 0 = 0.
By stacking the extended
To extract the system's trajectory x from the extended state trajectory µ we define a matrix T x so that
Intuitively, the problem is unbounded if the adversary creates an attack that influences x, but simultaneously leads to r = 0, which implies S a i+1 = 0, ∀i. By looking at (23) and (24) 
This directly leads to Corollary 1: Problem 1 is bounded only if
(28) Recall now that B e and D e are defined by B a and D a . Due to the special structure (11) of B a and D a , (28) is often not fulfilled, which also leads to the fact that (25) is not fulfilled. What does this mean for the adversary?
Theoretically the adversary can drive the plant to an unbounded state in a limited amount of time without being detected in this time. However, if this is the case, the attack will most probably be detected after the attack ended, e.g one time step after the attack ended
Considering that it is practically impossible to drive a system to a state with arbitrarily large norm in a finite amount of time and that the attacker also wants to be stealthy after the attack, to for example attack again, the adversary has to take the aftermath of his attack into account to stay undetected.
To obtain a bounded and stealthy attack for any k we define a new optimization problem, where the adversary considers the aftermath of his attack until the point N + ∆N − 1.
Problem 2: The worst-case attack impact an adversary can cause on the whole trajectory during the attack while remaining stealthy for any k ≥ 0 is characterized by instead of (21). Remember that the attacker is time-limited, hence a k = 0, ∀k ≥ N. Problem 2 is also bounded if Proposition 1 is fulfilled and the additional ∆N residuals usually lead to boundedness of the problem. From now on we assume that Problem 2 is bounded, i.e. ker(D c ) ⊆ ker(T Norm T x B c ), and ∆N ≥ 0 is chosen so that the attack is stealthy for any k ≥ 0.
B. Solution to the Optimization Problem
Before we propose a way to solve the problem let us show first that the detectors represent convex constraints on a.
Proposition 2: The stateless and CUSUM detector constraints in Problem 1 and 2 are convex.
Proof: Starting with the residual we use (31) to define a matrix D c k , so that
The squared Euclidean norm of the residual is then given by
which represents convex quadratic inequality constraints on a
since Q k is a positive semi-definite matrix. Therefore a stateless detector represents convex constraints. Now let us prove by induction that the CUSUM detector also represents convex constraints on a. First we prove that S a 0 is convex. Here, S a 0 = 0 is constant and therefore simultaneously convex and concave in a. Now assume S a k is convex and let us prove that S a k+1 is convex as well. We know that ||r a k || 2 2 is convex and furthermore −δ a is convex because it is constant. Using [12, p.79] we get that the nonnegative weighted sum of convex functions is convex and taking the maximum of two convex functions also results in a convex function. Hence, S a k + ||r a k || 2 2 − δ a is convex and because of that S a k+1 = max(0, S a k + ||r a k || 2 2 − δ a ) is also convex, which concludes the proof by induction that S a k represents convex constraints for all k.
Solving Problem 2 is not a trivial task. On the one hand we have N + ∆N constraints to fulfill, which is hard to solve analytically. On the other hand it is a non-convex problem, because we try to maximize a convex function (||T Norm x|| ∞ ) over convex constraints. This makes the problem difficult to solve numerically as well, because the numerical solution found is not necessarily the global optimum as it would be in the case of a convex optimization problem.
To solve Problem 2 numerically and obtain the global solution we use the definition of the infinity norm ||T Norm x|| ∞ = max(|τ T 1 x|, · · · , |τ T Nn x|), where τ T l ∈ R 1×Nn are the rows of T Norm , and solve the problem element-wise, as stated in the following theorem. Theorem 1: A worst-case attack a * , which remains stealthy and maximizes its impact as described in Problem 2 is obtained by the maximum instance of Nn convex optimization problems,
for all i ∈ {0, · · · , N + ∆N − 1} and ∆N ≥ 0.
Proof: Let us first prove that we can eliminate the absolute value in the definition of the infinity norm due to the linearity of τ T l x = τ T l T x B c a in a. Assume one finds two feasible solutions for the problem, a * max and a * min , which lead to the maximum and minimum value of (35) under the constraints, x * max and x * min , respectively. We assume that x * min < 0 < x * max and x * max < |x * min |. Due to the linearity in a we are able to define a * = −a * min as a feasible solution for (35), which leads to a higher value than x * max . Hence, (35) has the same solution as with the absolute value. Furthermore we obtain a convex optimization problem, since τ T l x = τ T l T x B c a is linear in a and linear functions are simultaneously convex and concave [12, p.67] . Equation (35) has the advantage that the solution found numerically is also the global solution, but the disadvantage is that one has to solve Nn convex optimization problems instead of one non-convex optimization problem, which does not scale well in N and n. However, in some situations the number of problems greatly reduce. For example,
Norm x a N || ∞ . Intuitively, when the adversary does not consider the aftermath of the attack, he will deteriorate the system as much as possible during the attack, which leads to the highest deterioration at the final attack instance. Note that, each of the Nn optimization problems is feasible, since a = 0 is always a feasible solution. If a = 0 is returned as the worst-case attack it shows us that there exists no stealthy attack with an attack impact greater than zero.
1) Reformulation of the CUSUM constraint: An equivalent reformulation of the CUSUM constraint is introduced that does not use the non-smooth max operator, which leads to a better numerical implementation in the numerical examples shown later.
Proposition 3: For a given scalar function f , the two optimization problems
and
for 0 ≤ k ≤ N + ∆N − 1 are equivalent in the sense that their optimal solutions a * , if they exist, coincide.
Proof: First of all we can easily see that S a k ≤ P k , ∀k, if a is fixed and feasible in both (36) and (37). Assume first one obtains an optimal solution a * CUSUM for (36). This solution also fulfills the constraints of (37), since P k = S a k ≤ J a D , which makes a * CUSUM a feasible solution for (37). But by solving (37) directly we might find a solution a * r such that,
Assume now one has an optimal solution (a * r , {P * k }
N+∆N−1 k=0
) for (37) and one uses S a k = P * k in (36), where we pick a feasible sequence {P * k }
for (36) by using the lower bounds P * k+1 = max(0, P * k + ||r a k || 2 2 − δ a ), which does not change the value of the objective function of (37). Then (a * r , {P * k }
) fulfills the constraints of (36) and is therefore a feasible solution for (36). But again we might find a solution by solving (36) directly such that,
Therefore the inequalities (38) and (39) imply f (a * CUSUM ) = f (a * r ), which makes the problems equivalent and the reformulation valid.
C. Thresholds of the Detectors
The stateless detector has only one parameter that we can vary, namely its threshold J a D , which we henceforth call J th . With the forgetting factor δ a and its threshold J a D CUSUM has two parameters to vary. To compare the detectors, we are fixing the threshold J th of the stateless detector and investigate the following two thresholds J a D for the CUSUM (1) J a D = J th and (2) J a D = J th − δ a while varying the forgetting factor δ a ∈ [0, J th ]. The first threshold is chosen as the threshold of the stateless detector, while the second threshold is chosen so that the CUSUM detector also exceeds its threshold J a D if ||r a k || 2 2 > J th as the stateless detector would do.
I V. S I M U L AT I O N S
For the simulations we use a simple example system to investigate the behavior of the worst-case impact of a timelimited data injection attack under the two detectors. The system used is taken from [5, p.28] . The system has two states x k ∈ R 2 , one input u k ∈ R and two outputs y k ∈ R 2 , where the input and the first output signal are attacked, thus a k ∈ R 2 . The system is controlled by a linear-quadratic Gaussian controller. For the stateless detector we use J th = 1 · 10 −4 and we define T x Norm = diag (10, 20) . We use an attack horizon of N = 10 and set ∆N = 2 so that the conditions in Proposition 1 are fulfilled and the attack is stealthy. We apply the attacks to the linearized discrete-time plant described in [5, p.28] .
A. Worst-case Attack Impact Under the Detectors
The results of the simulation by solving (35) for the stateless detector and the reformulated CUSUM detector are shown in Fig. 1 . This figure shows that the CUSUM detector results in a smaller worst-case impact than the stateless detector for the threshold J th − δ a and all δ a (lower plot of Fig. 1 ). The worst-case impact is limited more than in the stateless detector case for the threshold J a D = J th if δ a ≤ 8.564 · 10 −5 (upper plot of Fig. 1 ). In this case, we actually benefit the attacker if the forgetting factor is too high, since the detector also starts forgetting events, which should be detected, i.e. the attacker's actions. This is not the case for the threshold J th − δ a because it changes with the forgetting factor and does not benefit the attacker for any configuration, since the threshold decreases if the forgetting factor increases. Fig. 1 shows that the adversary is not able to drive the system to an unsafe state in N = 10 time steps for both detectors, since ||T norm x|| ∞ < 1 (see Problem 1) . Note that the attacker would be able to bring the system to an unsafe state while remaining stealthy if for example the attack time N is chosen sufficiently large.
Let us now look at the attack signal a k and the state x a k obtained by solving Problem 2. Example trajectories under a CUSUM detector with J a D = J th , ∆N = 2 and δ a = 5 · 10 −5 are illustrated in Fig. 2 . We can see that the maximum deterioration of the state trajectory x happens at k = 5 before the attack ends. Since the adversary considers the aftermath of his attack, he has to use his resources to reverse the attack effects and bring the system back to a credible state to remain stealthy after the attack.
B. Attack Impact vs. False Alarms
To further illustrate the usefulness of the developed tools, we show how they can be applied to compute the metric proposed in [8] with our attack model. The metric shows the trade-off between the worst-case attack impact and the mean time between false alarms E{T f a } while varying a parameter of the detector. In [8] , the threshold of the detectors is varied, while we vary the forgetting factor δ ∈ [0, J th ] as it is done in the previous section.
To generate the metric with our tools we assume a more powerful attacker than earlier. We consider an attacker, which actually knows the noise sequence for the considered attack time interval, i.e. for N + ∆N time steps, and we are not splitting the system and the detector into two virtual parts as in Section II-B.3. We have to consider the influence of the noise on the whole system to obtain the mean time between false alarms. By adjusting our optimization framework to this attack model we can obtain the worst-case attack impacts under the different detectors. We use again J th = 1 · 10 −4 for our detectors. The mean time between false alarms is obtained by a simulation without an attack and is approximated as E{T f a } ≈ T s n f a , where T s = 1000 s is the simulation time and n f a the number of false alarms that occurred during that time. The noise is assumed to be w k ∼ N (0, 10 −5 · I n ) and v k ∼ N (0, 10 −5 · I p ) and being uncorrelated.
The result is depicted in Fig. 3 . The stateless detector is marked as one point in the metric, since the variation of the forgetting factor will not influence this detector. In Fig. 3 , we can see that the threshold J th for the CUSUM should be preferred over the threshold J th − δ , because it results both in a lower attack impact and a higher mean time between false alarms than the stateless detector, if δ ∈ [3.357 · 10 −5 , 8.771 · 10 −5 ]. Note also that the attack impact is higher than in Fig. 1 because of the stronger attacker. Fig. 3 is just one example of how the developed tools can be applied to the metric of [8] .
V. C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper, we characterized worst-case impacts of a stealthy time limited data injection attack under the stateless and CUSUM detector, in terms of an optimization problem. To obtain a global optimum the problem is broken down into several convex optimization problems and for numerical implementation a reformulation of the CUSUM constraint is proposed. In a simple example, it is shown that the CUSUM limits the attacker more than the stateless detector, if the CUSUM is configured appropriately.
Our results complement [8] , since it is also shown there, in different scenarios, that the CUSUM limits the attack impact more than the stateless detector. Our way to characterize the worst-case attack as an optimization problem can be seen as an extension to the attack characterization in [8] . One extension would be the analysis and comparison of more detectors, as it is done with the multivariate exponentially weighted moving average filter in [13] . Yet another research direction would be an investigation of how the system design can limit the adversary, since we showed that the attacker has to undo his actions to remain stealthy. 
